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Abstract  
Scholarship on ancient Greco-Roman magic, over time and place, has largely 
focused on the role and identity of ritual practitioners, investigating the nature and 
source of their perceived expertise and often locating it in their linguistic skills. Less 
attention has been paid to those identified as the targets of magical rituals, who tend 
to be described as passive recipients of the ritual or the social power of another. In 
contrast, drawing on the theory of ritual form developed by Robert McCauley and E. 
Thomas Lawson, alongside the ritualization theories of Catherine Bell, this article 
argues that victims of magic were also agents of ritual. Focusing on an experience of 
hostile magic reported by the fourth-century CE orator Libanius, it explores how 
conceptions of magical power were co-created by spell-makers and their so-called 
victims and should be regarded as relational, that is, as emerging from the 
interactions of people and groups.  
 
Magic: The Role of the Victim?  
How did magic “work”? In scholarship on the practice of ancient magic, research into 
the perceived power of ancient Greco-Roman magic, be it archaic, classical, or 
Hellenistic, Republican or Imperial, has tended to focus on the role and activities of 
the ritual specialists or practitioners: for example, the manteis or magoi alluded to 
across different written sources, the largely unknown writers and/or authors of the 
corpus of binding spells, the intended users and/or the anonymous composers of the 
recipes in the Greek Magical Papyri. Much important work has been done to 
investigate the various indices of the expertise of such individuals.i For example, 
there has been extensive discussion of how they may have identified themselves 
and/or were identified by others in particular communities and the rhetoric that 
encompassed their claims to, or others’ ascriptions to them of, knowledge and 
power.  
The ancient evidence indicates that such specialists might make assertions about 
the range and level of their own skills not only based on their own activities, but also 
reinforced by their claims to remarkable relationships, personal or professional, to 
families or clans of manteis or seers (see Flower 2008: 242; more generally on this 
topic, see Frankfurter 1995, 1997, 2002, esp. 2002: 160–161). Alongside their own 
claims, many of those involved would, in turn, have been vocal in dismissing the 
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abilities and capacities, and therefore the authority, of the teaching of others. We see 
examples of this rhetoric in, for example, the anonymous Hippocratic treatise On the 
Sacred Disease (see Lloyd 1979: 15–29, 86–98; Laskaris 2002) and the Derveni 
Papyrus (esp. col. 20; see Betegh 2004: 42–43).  
In these claims and counterclaims, modern observers glimpse a highly competitive 
community; moreover, as the examples make clear, and as has long been observed 
in scholarship, it was one that did not neatly inhabit one (modern) category of 
activity. An extreme example of this phenomenon is offered by the pre-Socratic 
philosopher Empedokles, who may also be described as “a magician and a 
philosopher, a wonder-worker and a thinker” (Kingsley 1995: 231). The rhetoric 
concerning what was deemed acceptable or unacceptable religious activity and 
ensuing debates are part of a discourse that played an important part in the 
elaboration of the very concept of magic itself (e.g., Graf 1995; Dickie 2001; Carastro 
2006 offers a useful reflection on the role played in this development by both the 
actual presence and the representation of the Persian magoi in ancient Greek 
culture). It suggests, as Richard Gordon has put it, with a vivid and effective image, 
how “the notion of magic . . . was formed in the ancient world discontinuously and, as 
it were, with everybody talking at once” (1999: 163).  
The theme of the power of speech is significant to this debate in other ways. 
Understandably, bearing in mind the extant sources, scholars of ancient magic have 
focused much of their exploration on what factors may endow a ritual specialist’s 
language with power. Drawing on anthropological work in this area (such as, for 
example, Tambiah 1968), scholarship has examined the different dimensions of 
ancient magical language, including, for example, the use of metaphor, simile, or 
analogy;ii the employment of historiolae (little mythic stories; see Frankfurter 1995); 
the use of nonsense words, words from other languages; or folklore motifs (Otto 
2011: 160, 403–407; Versnel 2002). Some examination has been made of the 
performance of ritual and the ways in which this, too, may also have created a 
perception of magical power. Again (and understandably, since these aspects must 
generally be elicited from descriptions), this approach also tends to return to 
language: it has raised the question of the role of performativity, particularly speech-
act theory (Prins 1991; Giordano 1999), along with the potency of reversals and 
inversions.iii But there has also been some significant exploration of the role and 
symbolism of magical objects and materials (LiDonnici 2002; Boschung and 
Bremmer 2015). Altogether, such work on the perceived ritual competence of the 
agents of magical spells brings an increasingly rich understanding of ancient magic 
and its perceived power, both in its broader social context and with regard to specific 
examples.  
The tendency of this research to focus on speech may be why, in contrast, relatively 
little attention has been paid to those perceived to be the victims or targets of magic. 
When they are discussed, it tends to be within a fairly limited remit. Usually, they 
appear as part of the examination of the aims of the practitioner. For example, 
Christopher Faraone describes how the terms of ancient erotic spells construct 
women, in particular, as desiring subjects (1999: 159–174), while I have discussed in 
my own work the targets of ancient binding spells as the foci of risks for those writing 
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against them (2013: 143–236). Other scholars have noted how victims may become, 
in turn, practitioners, leading to what Daniel Ogden has vividly termed “a magical 
arms-race” (1999: 51–54, esp. 52). There is also some limited acknowledgment of a 
more active role played by victims in discussions of, for example, the emotional 
responses of individuals to specific situations of (erotic) anxiety or fear (see Tomlin 
1988; Winkler 1990; Ogden 1999, esp. 82–85; some of these will be discussed in 
more detail below). However, in large part, these remain limited to speculations 
concerning individual psychology. This is notably different from anthropological (and 
historical) approaches to such questions, which, since E. E. Evans-Pritchard’s 1937 
ground-breaking work among the Azande, are commonly analyzed in terms of 
culturally specific beliefs in witchcraft, beliefs which are an integral part of a broader 
worldview. Thus, Evans-Pritchard described witchcraft as providing “a natural 
philosophy by which the relations between men and unfortunate events are 
explained and a ready and stereotyped means of reacting to such events” (1937: 
63).iv  
One reason for the strikingly different approach of ancient historians is no doubt the 
nature of the ancient evidence: most of that which dates from the archaic to 
Hellenistic periods attributes personal or community misfortune to the displeasure of 
the gods rather than the magical attack of one’s mortal enemies, although there are 
some striking exceptions to this (see Eidinow 20156a: 67). This attitude begins to 
change in the Hellenistic era; as Gordon has argued, the Hellenistic period saw the 
development of a “strong notion of magic” (1999: 164). This may perhaps be taken 
as a further indication of the increasingly personal relationship with supernatural 
forces that is sometimes given as a characteristic of this era, although, as Matthew 
Dickie observes, while literary references to magic-working increase in this period, it 
is much more difficult to argue that there was actually greater practice of magic 
(2001: 93–96).  
However we regard these developments, the result seems to be that most 
scholarship on ancient magic tends to overlook the victims in ways rather similar to 
the discourse of the ancient evidence itself. This seems to occur even in cases 
where scholars have observed that such an approach in the ancient text may be a 
deliberate rhetorical device intended to undermine the role of the victim, reinforce the 
power of others, and justify the social control of the former by the latter. For example, 
this argument has been made for the portrayal of women in early Christian texts 
dating to the second century CE.v  
Whether deliberately or not, such descriptions, ancient or modern, portray a victim as 
having lost agency — either in representation or in fact. The victim is not the only 
one who misses out: one of the effects of this approach is that modern observers are 
unable to gain a full picture of the ways in which magic “worked” in ancient cultures. 
This article offers a different approach to thinking about the victims of spells. It uses 
anthropological and cognitive theories to recast them as agents in what is, it argues, 
a process that itself generates the perceived power of magic.  
In terms of agency, this article employs the categories put forward by Sherry Ortner 
(2006) — that is, the agency of power and the agency of projects. The former 
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concerns a person’s power to act for him or herself or on others, raising questions of 
domination and resistance; the latter describes a person’s capacity to pursue her or 
his own intentions and desires, without involvement in situations of power, as defined 
above. Although the separation of these two categories is useful for heuristic 
purposes, in reality, their manifestations frequently overlap and interact. Using these 
terms, we can argue that in the current analysis of ancient magic, the focus is largely 
on issues of power and almost completely on the agency of power of the practitioner. 
This article argues that the agency of magical power, or, rather, the perception of 
that power, is created not only through the agency of the practitioner, but in addition 
through the agency of the victim. As Ortner has argued, “individuals or persons or 
subjects are always embedded in webs of relations, whether of affection and 
solidarity, or of power and rivalry” (2006: 151); the acquisition and exercise of 
agency is, thus, interactive and dynamic. In this sense, then, this article sets out to 
illustrate how “magic” and its perception is not a phenomenon that is activated by 
one person against another but, rather, should be regarded as a relational dynamic 
emerging from the interactions of people and groups. In that context, consideration of 
the role of the victim is important not only to further understanding of the ways in 
which individual rituals were perceived to occur. It also deepens our comprehension 
of the construction and maintenance of the overall plausibility of “magic” in the 
ancient world: that is, it moves us a little further towards an answer to the question of 
whether and, if so, how people believed in magic.  
This then, finally, is also the place to say something about my use of the term magic. 
I will not attempt a definition of this notoriously difficult term: suffice it to say that, as 
is probably already apparent, I am employing it here, etically, to denote a specific 
category of ritual practice in which supernatural forces were somehow employed (be 
that harnessed, cajoled and persuaded, or forced) by one person to attack another. 
This use does also evoke the perception of the protagonist of the case study used 
later in this article: Libanius, the fourth-century CE orator for whom “magic . . . was 
characterized by the use of body parts and dead animals and by the desire to do 
harm” (Sandwell 2007: 265).  
However, this use is not intended to imply either that this was the sole remit of this 
term as it is used in modern scholarship or that there were not many different emic 
terms for individual ritual practices, with nuances that distinguish them one from 
another and perhaps associate some more closely with more mainstream practices, 
such as prayer (see Versnel 1991b). In a number of my examples, the use of specific 
emic terms means that the identification of such activities is perhaps more secure. 
Studies of the development of the idea of magic in fifth to fourth-century BCE Greece 
provide helpful insight into the difficulties of identifying and categorizing relevant 
activities in emic terms (see for example, Graf 1995; Dickie 2001). However, my aim 
with this article is that the analysis it presents should also be applicable across 
similar situations in which no such terms can be located. I think that the ample 
scholarship on the concept of “magic” suggests that there is general scholarly 
consensus in identifying which activities, across cultures, belong to such a category, 
drawing on cross-cultural patterns in ritual activities and the attitudes towards them. 
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On this basis, I will be using evidence from across different ancient cultures and 
communities and referring to it here as magic.  
In what follows I begin with a consideration of recent scholarship’s approach to the 
question of how magic works. My focus is on the broader category of ancient curses. 
I include both binding spells and prayers for justice, on the grounds that the ritual 
form is sufficiently similar, since both involve the invocation of supernatural forces 
against an enemy, seeking to damage them in some way. The rituals involved in the 
creation of both types appear often to have involved the inscription of a text on a lead 
tablet and the manipulation of lead figurines or dead animals (see Faraone 1991a–b; 
for differences between the two categories, see Versnel 2010). I then examine the 
ways in which two theories of ritual can aid in reviewing and perhaps recasting 
approaches to the role of the victim’s agency in ancient magical practice. These 
theories emerge from two different approaches to the study of religion, one cognitive, 
and the other practice-based. One of the aims of this article is to explore how these 
may be used alongside one another. The article ends with some reflections on the 
implications that this may carry for scholarship on ancient magic and religion and the 
question of the nature of belief.  
 
How Does Magic Work?  
Roger Tomlin, in his masterful introduction to the analysis of the curse tablets from 
the Temple of Sulis Minerva at Bath, explains how the evidence indicates that the 
ancients did believe in the efficacy of creating these texts: “[T]he practice of 
inscribing them for two centuries . . . implies that they did work. Or rather that they 
were believed to work; and, perhaps, that this belief was justified” (1988: 101–102). 
In trying to explain how these were understood to work, he turns to psychological or 
emotionalist explanations: the process of writing the tablet “removed intolerable 
tensions”, “allowed a transfer of emotions”, and, in general, “relieved the injured 
party’s feelings; something at least had been done.”vi  
In the Bath tablets, the crime that most commonly prompts the writing of the curse is 
that of stealing, but similar arguments have been made for the use of ancient magic 
in other spheres, perhaps most famously by Jack Winkler (1990), concerning 
attraction magic. In his acute analysis, Winkler argues that this ritual practice acted 
as a powerful therapy for those individuals (usually male) who were suffering the 
torments of eros. He explains how the person activating the spell would be able to 
imagine the victim as suffering the very agonies that he was experiencing because of 
his passion. This was a therapeutic process that created a new reality by effectively 
reversing existing circumstances: the result of writing the tablet for the spell-maker 
was a sense of control, as Winkler puts it, “over his own desperation”; the process of 
summoning “chthonic powers to do terrible things . . . puts him in a role opposed to 
that of the erotic victim he ‘actually’ is” (1990: 91).  
To evaluate this approach, we might briefly compare the argument put forward by 
Jonathan Z. Smith, which takes a similar approach to magic as the amelioration of 
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anxiety, although it turns on an opposing paradigm. According to Smith, the ritual still 
models what should happen if everything were to go according to plan and all 
variables work as they should, but he argues that far from working with the model 
“like produces like,” the principle is rather “unrealistic perfection” (1980: 127). Thus, 
where Winkler argues that magical rituals are intended to “compel the world through 
representation and manipulation” (1990: 91), Smith has argued that they express a 
realistic assessment of the fact “that the world cannot be compelled” (1980: 127). 
The therapeutic effect emerges for the ritualists not from their asserting control, but 
from re-understanding their lack of control.  
Smith’s approach has been criticized by Benjamin Ray, specifically in the context of 
its use to explain the bear rituals of the Koyukon of Alaska. Ray challenges the 
ethnographic basis for Smith’s assessment of the bear ritual as a ritualized “perfect 
hunt” and so unpicks his argument that it provides “symbolic compensation for a 
perceived failure” in the real world (1991: 159). Nevertheless, he also finds some 
broader insights in Smith’s approach, observing how it differs markedly from the 
more widely held anthropological view that “ritual provides a rich and ‘deep’ 
interpretation of the world that the believer accepts as true and acts upon” and offers 
instead a radical interpretation of ritual as “an idealistic interpretation of the world” 
(1991: 164; as found in, for example, Geertz 1973: 112; Douglas 1966: 66). 
However, he argues, if that is the case, can those conducting the ritual be 
understood to believe their own words (or not) (1991: 171)? Ray argues against 
Smith that the language of the bear ritual must reveal the hunters’ views of how 
things are; it provides the Koyukon perspective.  
Winkler’s approach can be described as starting from a similar basis to Smith’s: he 
explains the potency of erotic magic as arising from the therapeutic side effects of 
conducting a ritual that imagines perfection. His approach has also prompted similar 
questions: for example, Faraone has taken issue with Winkler’s portrayal of young 
male erotic spell-writers and his interpretation of the erotic spells (1999: 80–95). He 
argues that in fact only a minority of ancient spells express the passionate 
desperation for which Winkler argues, and in the case of those few, it remains 
unclear what their motivations may be. In light of similar spells written for social 
advancement or sexual conquest, Faraone has suggested that the erotic spells were 
written not in psychic pain but focused on hopes for the future, their effect not “one of 
healing or catharsis, but rather one of increased self-confidence” (1999: 84). This 
reception of both Winkler’s and Smith’s analyses are a reminder of the need to 
distinguish between the emic understanding that may be found in our evidence and 
the etic paradigms of scholarly discourse to which it may appear to conform. In the 
meantime, with regard to the larger argument of this article, we note that both these 
arguments and the critiques they provoke focus on the psychology of the 
perpetrators of magical ritual and pay little attention to the mental state of the target 
of magic, in either emic or etic terms.  
However, as observed above, psychological insights have also been brought to bear 
on explanations of the target’s behavior in particular by highlighting a perceived 
connection between target and spell-caster, such as the shared experience of a 
crime. Tomlin, for example, argues that the target of a curse of the kinds found at 
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Bath, i.e., a thief, “might suspect that he had been cursed by his victim,” provoking a 
psychosomatic illness (1988: 102–103; see also Ogden 1999: 82–85, esp. 84 on the 
possible manipulation of a potential victim’s fear). In some contexts, there could have 
been explicit, material confirmation of such suspicions. There is evidence that so-
called “prayers for justice,” were pinned up in public places,vii but presumably, in 
these cases, less guilt would produce less of a psychological effect; moreover, as a 
mode of crime prevention, fear of such an affliction probably worked better against 
casual offenders than hardened criminals.  
Where there seems to have been no specific event, such as a crime, to create an 
overt connection between two parties, we might imagine that such a link could 
emerge from existing social dynamics. Distrust, exacerbated by local gossip, could 
provoke someone suffering personal misfortune to identify the likely perpetrator of a 
suspected hostile attack, on the grounds that the aggressor must be motivated by 
malice or envy.viii The well-known confession inscriptions from ancient Asia Minor, 
although dealing with divine punishment rather than mortal hostility, provide powerful 
examples of such social processes of explanations of misfortune (Petzl 1994; 
Gordon 2004; Chaniotis 2004). Scholars have observed how in ancient Greek and 
Roman cultures such explanations that one had become the target of magical attack 
could work within a community as “a strategy to explain otherwise inexplicable 
failures” and as a way for people “to immunize themselves against possible negative 
social consequences” (Graf 1997b: 113; see, for example, Faraone 1989).  
To illustrate a number of these explanatory approaches, we can turn to one of the  
best known ancient accounts of magical victimhood. This is from the autobiography 
of the fourth-century CE sophist and rhetor Libanius, who studied in Athens and 
taught in Constantinople and Nicomedia before settling in the city of his birth, 
Antioch, where he took up the post of sophist and ran a school of rhetoric. This is 
one of the few first-person accounts of a magical attack from ancient Greece and 
Rome that we possess.ix It is not intended that it should be taken as representative of 
all such experiences across antiquity — and it will be set in its specific context below. 
Nevertheless, it is notable that a number of its details align with briefer, third-person 
accounts of magical attack, including physical and mental pain, and the inability to 
speak (for an overview of these, see Faraone 1991a; Graf 1997a: 119, 141–142). In 
addition, in support of this argument, some of the specific requests for suffering 
invoked against the victims of binding spells resonate with aspects of Libanius’ 
description of his experience (Eidinow 2013: 146–156).  
To set Libanius’ account briefly in its context: the fourth century was a period of 
profound social, political, and spiritual tensions. Libanius was a pagan living in a 
world in which Christianity was in the ascendant, and the significance of particular 
ritual activities was contested across and between different social and religious 
groups (Sandwell 2007: 251–276). As a professional sophist, Libanius worked in a 
highly competitive, elite environment in which aggressive magical attack was widely 
feared, and accusations of magical practice abounded (Cribiore 2007: 90–95, 2013). 
Libanius’ account is the creation of a highly literate and rhetorically skillful writer; 
moreover, it provides a commentary on a period of tremendous anxiety and stress 
for Libanius, resulting from both physical ailments and political dangers (including 
This is the accepted draft for publication; please do not cite.  
Contact esther.eidinow@bristol.ac.uk for information 
The final version is in Numen 64 (2017): 394–417. 
 
accusations of magic against his colleagues; see Norman 2000: 124). This might 
lead modern readers to doubt its value as a historical document offering insight into 
general perceptions of the experience of magical victimhood, its historical value 
undermined by both Libanius’ artistry and his personal agenda. But I would argue 
that these aspects may increase its potential for our purposes. It seems plausible 
that in attempting to persuade his reader of the reality of his suffering, Libanius 
would have drawn on widely accepted cultural models of the experience of a magical 
attack and used his literary skills to evoke its details.  
Libanius’ description offers insights into his own mental and emotional reactions, and 
includes observations that allow us to glimpse some of the wider social processes 
surrounding the event (Orations 1.245–249). He recounts how he became 
unsociable: he wass unable to visit the baths or go to dinner. He could not work: he 
turned away from his books, avoided composing his own work, and  could not 
declaim. There were physical and associated emotional or mental symptoms: he was 
crippled by physical pain, was fearful, and wished to die. Without making an overt 
statement or accusation, he revealed that his own explanations of these events 
tended towards suspicion of a magical attack: he had dreams that seemed to 
portend “spells, incantations, and the hostility of sorcerers” (Orations 1.245).x 
Moreover, his misgivings were probably exacerbated by what other people were 
saying. Only a brief glimpse of this is given in Libanius’ cursory mentions of 
conversations or general gossip: for example, he describes how, in the early stages 
of his illness, his “friends kept urging me, and each other too, to prosecute certain 
individuals who were rumoured to be responsible for this” (Orations 1.248). Libanius 
restrained them, “telling them to offer up prayers rather than to have folk arrested for 
secret machinations” (Orations 1.248). And when he was very ill, he tells us, there 
were people “prophesying that I would be dead before morning, and, in fact, in other 
cities it was said that I was dead already” (Orations 1.247). These narrative seeds 
are well sown: all these implicit suspicions are borne out once a dead and 
misshapen chameleon is dug out of his study wall. This is clearly a magical attack: 
the head of the animal has been tucked between its hind legs, one front leg is 
missing while the other is covering its mouth as if to silence it (Orations 1.249).  
In our attempt to understand what Libanius, and others like him, may have 
experienced, the psychological explanations listed above are extremely useful. We 
can set him in a context in which the fear of magical attack was pervasive. Not only 
did Libanius have plenty of rivals; some of them, we know, accused him of practicing 
magic against them, especially in contexts where he had beaten them in rhetorical 
competitions (Orations 1.43; cf. Brown 1970). Once he begins to suffer symptoms 
that prevent him from working or teaching, it seems plausible that he would be 
looking for an explanation, for others and for himself, to help soothe the social 
pressures of not performing well (see, for example, Faraone 1991a: 15–16; Graf 
1997a: 164–165; Ogden 1999: 27–28). Indeed, from what he says, it is apparent that 
others around him easily took up such an explanation and knew enough about 
Libanius’ relationships — those with whom he competed, for example — to be able 
to pinpoint likely perpetrators.  
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Such analyses offer crucial insights into some of the social dynamics related to the 
psychology of victimhood. Nevertheless, they still tend towards an implicit view of 
victims of magic as simply reactive or passive. Where the ancients saw victims of 
magical attack, these analyses depict victims of the social dynamics that we have 
come to understand magic to represent — be these the dynamics of power, politics, 
and/or social control. In contrast, I want to suggest instead that we can find grounds 
to describe these victims as themselves exhibiting agency and, moreover, argue that 
their agency helped to generate the culturally shared perception of the nature and 
role of magic.  
 
Ritual Form and Ritual Agency  
As Gordon has observed for ancient Greco-Roman magic, while “we have no hope 
of examining in detail the construction of magical rituals” (2008: 147), we can still use 
the notion of magical action as symbolic to examine the social sites of magic. In 
general, such investigations tend to focus on aspects relating to the magical 
practitioner: Gordon’s own list includes, for example, social contexts, the question of 
the place of “magical healing,” the kinds of people who become magicians, and the 
hierarchy of roles and capacities. This article suggests that we may also identify the 
victim himself or herself as one of those sites; but this raises the question of a 
suitable methodology. As noted above, analysis of the power of ancient magical 
practitioners has often focused on the nature of the performative power of ritual 
speech, which brings us to Stanley Tambiah’s approach to ritual. He has described 
this as a “culturally constructed system of symbolic communication . . . constituted of 
patterned and ordered sequences of words and acts, often expressed in multiple 
media, whose content and arrangement are characterized in varying degree by 
formality (conventionality), stereotype (rigidity), condensation (fusion), and 
redundancy (repetition)” (1979: 119). As this indicates, Tambiah at first gives equal 
weight to “sequences of words and acts”, but, while recognizing the need for both, 
the focus of his analysis largely comes to rest on the nature of the performative 
power of ritual speech. In contrast, the ancient victims of magical attack, for the most 
part, offer us few equivalent verbal resources; nevertheless, these fundamental 
concepts of communication, performativity, and the “sequences of words and acts” 
are also significant in considering the ritual agency of the victim. Here, I want to 
focus in particular on the role of sequences of “acts” as a form of communication.  
My approach to the ritual agency of “victims” of magic draws on the idea of the ritual 
form, using the theory developed by Robert McCauley and E. Thomas Lawson to 
analyze perceptions of the performance of religious rituals.xi The theory builds on 
competence theories in the field of linguistics to explain the implicit acquisition of 
ritual systems and posits an “action representation system” to explain conceptions of 
ritual action. Thus, the ritual form comprises three fundamental roles — agent, act 
(by means of instruments), and patient. Each of the three roles may be represented 
as related to superhuman agency; McCauley and Lawson call this the Principle of 
Superhuman Agency, or PSA (see McCauley and Lawson 2002: 26–27), which 
involves culturally postulated superhuman (hereafter CPS) agents, that is, some kind 
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of agent with greater than mortal powers that is specific to a particular culture. Such 
CPS-agency may be linked to the mortal agent of the ritual, like a priest; or CPS-
agents may be the patients of a ritual, such as the divine recipients of sacrifice; or 
they may transform the instrument of the ritual, as when holy water is transformed 
from ordinary water because of such a connection.  
McCauley and Lawson (2002: 8) stress two key aspects: first, that their approach 
comprises a theory of ritual competence, that is, “a systematic account, which 
describes participants’ knowledge about the acceptability of ritual performances . . . it 
is not a theory of ritual acts” (Lawson and McCauley 1990: 77; italics original). Thus, 
rituals are represented as efficacious actions because they exploit ordinary types of 
actions, which are recognized using everyday processes of social cognition 
(McCauley and Lawson 2002: 8, 11). Once the three roles of ritual are identified, 
then participants begin to generate inferences about the intention behind a ritual and 
its likely efficacy (McCauley and Lawson 2002: 12–14). Although different 
participants may come to very different conclusions about a ritual’s meaning, the 
theory argues that this does not affect the shared fundamental knowledge of the 
ritual form.  
The second aspect is that the role of CPS-agents is crucial for understanding the 
properties and powers attributed to ritual, and it is important where they appear. 
There may of course be more than one connection to a CPS-agent in any ritual, and 
it is important to identify how closely the CPS-agent is related in each case. This is 
what McCauley and Lawson call the Principle of Superhuman Immediacy, or PSI, 
which states that “the number of enabling rituals required to connect some element 
in the current ritual with an entry for a CPS-agent determines that entry’s proximity to 
the current ritual” (McCauley and Lawson 2002: 27). This can be illustrated with the 
example of an ancient binding-spell ritual, in which a professional spell-writer may 
simply assert a close relationship to a CPS-agent (no ritual appears to have been 
necessary to support this claim); whereas, for the CPS-agent to be cast as a patient 
in this ritual, a sacrifice would be necessary; and finally, for the instrument of the 
spell (for example, a dead animal or a lead tablet on which the spell is scratched) to 
be connected to CPS-agency, a number of enabling rituals would be required.  
Justin Barrett has summarized this theory as defining “ ‘religious rituals as acts in 
which someone does something to someone or something in order to bring about 
some non-natural consequence by virtue of appeal to superhuman agency” (2002: 
184). His précis emphasizes the importance of the ascription and recognition of 
agency, both CPS-agency and mortal agency — and the relationship between them. 
Indeed, McCauley and Lawson argue that a ritual will acquire certain particular 
qualities when it is a “special-agent ritual,” that is, when a god or representative of a 
god is in the agency slot (see McCauley and Lawson 2002: 187–202). This type of 
ritual is more likely to be marked with sensory pageantry, rousing emotional 
responses. While it is unlikely to be repeated, it is perceived to have more 
permanence — in the sense that its effects must be ritually removed, that is, they will 
not simply wear off. Moreover, they argue, changes in agents matter far more to 
participants than changes made to other elements of a ritual (McCauley and Lawson 
2002: 32–33, citing Barrett and Lawson 2001). Barrett has further developed this 
This is the accepted draft for publication; please do not cite.  
Contact esther.eidinow@bristol.ac.uk for information 
The final version is in Numen 64 (2017): 394–417. 
 
claim, demonstrating that it turns on the presumed nature of the CPS-agent involved: 
“observers will judge that having the proper sort of performer — and intentional 
agent — is more important than having the proper sort of action for a religious ritual 
to be successful, provided the superhuman agent appealed to has access to the 
intentions of the performer apart from the performance itself” (2002: 191; italics 
original). This, in turn, raises a final important point about the network of beliefs into 
which a ritual is integrated. McCauley and Lawson argue that a crucial aspect of 
understanding the particular involvement of superhuman agents in any ritual is tacit 
knowledge of the network of rituals that structure it (2002: 27–28). But perhaps more 
importantly here, as Jesper Sørensen has argued, are the perceived connections “to 
larger conceptual and institutional networks, and thus to both myth and dogma” 
(2007b: 295).12xii  
This approach can be applied to the example of Libanius so as to nuance our 
understanding of this event. Libanius and his friends identified an association 
between what were two completely separate events — an illness and the discovery 
of a dead chameleon. In fact, there was no evidence that the chameleon was part of 
a magical ritual with Libanius as its target. Libanius and those around him created a 
causal link between the two, interpreting the chameleon as cause of the preceding 
illness. In part, this occurs because of the temporal contiguity of the two events: the 
illness is understood as an indexical sign of the chameleon. But this in turn depends 
on cultural knowledge of the ritual form of such a magical attack (Sørensen 2005: 
105). The text describes how Libanius and his friends used their knowledge of the 
ritual form involved in the creation of a binding spell, drawing on a larger network of 
ritual and social knowledge, to explain Libanius’ suffering in terms of the experience 
of a victim of magic. Indeed, although the discovery of the chameleon appears to 
have brought to an end some of the psychological pressure on Libanius, by providing 
this explanation and enabling some action to be taken, there is evidence that it also 
confirmed Libanius’ fears that he had been the target of a magical attack (Orations 
36; see Norman 2000: 124; Eidinow 2016a: 160).  
This gives us some insight into the cognitive processes that may have underpinned 
attributions of a magical attack. But if we make Libanius’ actions the focus of our 
analysis rather than the byproduct, the theory of ritual form can also lead us to 
identify a further set of ritual actions in his description. As noted, although Libanius 
expresses fears of a previous ritual (and although with our knowledge of the ritual 
form of a binding spell, we are also tempted to assume one), as far as we know, 
there have in fact been no previous enabling rituals. Indeed, rather than being the 
fearful target or “patient” of an (imagined) ritual created by an anonymous, unseen 
practitioner, this so-called victim was himself actively engaged, in concert with those 
around him, in creating a separate ritual. In terms of the theory of ritual form, 
Libanius was himself the “special agent” in a ritualizing process that he described in 
his text, one in which his fear, his activities, and the interactions between himself and 
his friends were all generative elements.  
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The Victim as Ritualizing Agent  
In suggesting that we can identify in this set of actions a distinct ritual form, I am 
drawing on Catherine Bell’s approach to “ritualization.” The experiences of suffering 
that Libanius undergoes, or of the kinds of misfortunes that our sources indicate 
might lead to similar suspicions that one had been a target of magical attack, did not 
involve ways of acting that were wholly different from non-magical experiences. 
Rather, they were ritualized, recognized as “a way of acting that specifically 
establishes a privileged contrast, differentiating itself as more important or powerful” 
(Bell 1992: 90). The development of this differentiation, the process of this 
ritualization, was complex. In part, it drew on the recognition of ritual form, as 
described above, and the resonance of the victim’s experiences with the nexus of 
cultural schemas that were understood to comprise the experience of magical 
victimhood. In part, it comprised emergent strategies of ritualization, for example, in 
the case of Libanius, both in the interactions between him and his friends, as he 
describes them, and also those that continue to occur between his text and its 
reader.  
The terms “strategies” and “emergent” underline two key aspects of this activity that 
need further explanation. First, that of strategies: by setting off his experiences as 
important and distinct from others, Libanius engages in the reshaping of his position 
in a social — and cosmological — context. In doing so, he redescribes the relations 
not only between other mortals (himself, his friends, the larger community of people 
who are aware of the events through gossip), but also between mortals and gods. At 
issue in all these relations are questions of power — who has the power to harm, to 
protect, to endure, to win? We can see in these activities how, as Bell puts it, “ritual 
practices are themselves the very production and negotiation of power relations” 
(1992: 196). To return to Ortner’s categories of agency, the victim Libanius can be 
described as exercising in this episode an agency of power. In the analysis above, I 
have identified some of the ways in which Libanius does this, and this leads to my 
use of the term emergent. By introducing this, I mean to highlight the creative, almost 
improvisatory, role of the victim, that is, within culturally defined strictures.xiii Claude 
Levi-Strauss’s use of the bricoleur (1962) to evoke the operation of mythical thought 
has been employed successfully to describe the activities of a charismatic and 
creative spell-maker (Johnston 2002: 167). I suggest here that a “victim” of magical 
action was just as, and similarly, resourceful. So-called “victims” like Libanius were 
calling on ritual knowledge comprising cognitive schemas and scripts for particular 
ritual contexts and expressing that knowledge through a shared vocabulary of action.  
This still allowed for some extemporization in interpretation and responses, both by 
the individuals directly involved and their surrounding social group. I made reference 
earlier in this article to the artistry of Libanius, in terms of his literary skills. I return to 
it here — but now in consideration of his report as evidence for his skills in the 
development of ritualized action. In his account, we see how Libanius assembles a 
list of “symptoms” that conform to the kind of suffering understood to be experienced 
in a magical attack. The process of developing these symptoms and attributing them 
to a magical attack is interactive: we see how Libanius’ friends, and the wider 
community, respond to his distress. They recognize the cause of his suffering — 
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even, perhaps the likely perpetrator — and urge legal action; Libanius restrains them 
and asks instead for prayers — a ritual act within a ritualized context. Not only is 
recognition of what is happening to him shared, but so is the process by which that 
recognition develops. The discovery of a material cause of what is happening — the 
chameleon — occurs just as the request for prayers is made in the text, as if divinely 
sent. So far, I have emphasized events within the text, but this last observation also 
prompts us to consider the text itself as a key element by which Libanius was 
ritualizing his experience. His interaction with an audience went beyond the 
community of friends that he described to the community of readers that he was 
addressing: not only they, but we, too, are co-creators in the ritualization of 
victimhood.  
As this suggests, the generation of the role of the victim was a ritualized act; it 
organized the local social world and was, in turn, organized by that local social world. 
It not only employed shared knowledge of institutional structures, but also created 
them; and, as Bell describes, it both drew on relationships of power and helped to 
generate them.xiv But this creative process not only manipulated mortal relationships; 
it also worked in a similar way with supernatural forces. Jesper Sørensen has argued 
that “ritualized behaviour in producing cues . . . makes the evocation of existing 
culturally transmitted superhuman agents highly relevant or, alternatively, lead[s] to 
the production of new superhuman agents” (2007b: 297). Libanius invoked the gods, 
but, equally, it was his own sequence of actions and words, interacting with those of 
his friends and the larger social world, which generated the presence of supernatural 
forces.  
With this final point, I want to draw particular attention to the role of the body in this 
process of ritualization. Although Libanius is described as suffering physically, our 
focus on the verbal description of his experiences (both written and reported) means 
that it is easy to lose sight of the significance of his body in this process. The 
analysis of ritual performativity as physical expression has been a rich inspiration for 
scholarship on several different aspects of ancient culture, including, for a long time, 
ancient Greek religion.xv But, as noted earlier in this article, for understandable 
reasons, most previous scholarship on ancient magic has focused on the 
significance of words, in particular, speech-act theory, which puts the emphasis on 
language, especially the categories of performative utterances and illocutionary 
force.xvi  
An initial step in reintroducing the body to the discussion of ancient magic may be to 
consider the embodied nature of the ritualization enacted by victims of magic: the 
suffering that they endure is often, if not usually, described in physical terms. The 
ritual of magical victimhood is, at least at first, expressed through “a logic embodied 
in the physical movements of the body, and thereby lodged beyond the grasp of 
consciousness and articulation” (Bell 1992: 99). This evocation of implicit knowledge 
calls to mind the intuitive recognition described by the theory of ritual form; the 
“socialized body” operating within a “pre-existing set of structures” recalls the “larger 
conceptual and institutional networks” of the development of this theory described 
above (Bell 1992: 220; Sørensen 2007b: 295). And, as noted above, this process is 
importantly dynamic and creative: an individual claiming to be, or to be described as, 
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a victim of ancient magic was, through this physical communication, in the context of 
his social group, himself or herself recreating existing cultural relationships of power 
and authority, generating, maintaining, and reshaping ritual knowledge.  
 
The Relational Dynamics of Magic  
This article has used the theories of ritual form and of ritualization with the intention 
of developing current analyses of ancient magic by clarifying the social, physical, and 
cognitive processes — and their interactions — of those portrayed as victims of 
magic. It has argued that these figures, previously treated as passive or 
psychologically troubled, are in fact depicted as themselves deploying a culturally 
recognizable embodied ritualizing practice. They can, therefore, be described in 
Ortner’s terms, as demonstrating an agency of power. In a community in which 
magical aggression was both practiced and feared, the perceived potency of “magic” 
was not rooted simply in the (linguistic) activities of the creator of a spell. Instead, 
accounts of the behavior of individual targets of magic (either stipulated in spells or 
documented anecdotally) suggest that, concurrently, the ritualization of physical 
experiences by so-called victims also manufactured the phenomenon of magic. The 
perception of magical power, the experience of supernatural presence, was thus co-
created by ritual practitioners and their so-called victims — the agency of one 
reinforcing the agency of the other and vice versa.  
For this ritualization to be effective, both ritual practitioners and victims drew on 
cultural knowledge — both their own and that of the broader networks of social 
relations within which they were integrated. The interaction of social and cultural 
structures with individual perception and action is a crucial aspect of this analysis. In 
a context of scholarship on ancient Grego-Roman religion in which the place of the 
individual as opposed to the group and the role of ritual as opposed to belief remain 
topics of debate (see Versnel 2011, esp. 122–123), this analysis moves away from 
these dichotomies. Instead, this article has drawn attention to the ways in which, in a 
number of respects, the perception of magical power can be described as emerging 
from relational dynamics.  
Mind and body, individual and group, individual and broader culture all interacted in 
the development of ancient ritual and belief. As the example of Libanius has 
illustrated, it was the ritualized and embodied interrelationship of individual and 
society that generated, continually, the perceived presence of the supernatural and 
belief in the power of magic.  
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i It is of course impossible to cite all the relevant work here, and my references in this 
discussion will indicate only some works that I have found useful; the reader will no 
doubt wish to suggest others. This selectivity also applies to the citation and 
employment of work on ritual theory in the latter part of this article. 
ii See Collins 2008: 114–117, who offers a useful warning at the end of his analysis 
of the need for caution in interpretation. 
iii See, for example, Curbera 1999 on matronymics in ancient binding spells as an 
inversion of usual practice. 
iv From among many, some well-known examples include Douglas 1970 and Favret-
Saada 1980. Hutton 2004 provides an insightful review of the works in each 
discipline and the potential for collaboration between history and anthropology; 
witchcraft accusations are, of course, also a current political issue; see, for example, 
Schnoebelen 2009. 
v See Stratton 2007: 111–114, who summarizes previous scholarship, including 
D’Angelo 1990, Burrus 1995, Cooper 1996; cf. Eidinow 2016b. 
vi Tomlin 1988: 101–102, quoting Henig 1984: 145 and Webster 1986: 136; see a 
discussion of emotionalist theories of magic in Sørensen 2007a: 24–30.  
 
vii See Versnel 1991a: 68–69, elaborated in Versnel 2009. The Knidian curses texts 
may have been displayed in this way (Newton 1862–1863), or they may have been 
inscribed on stone. On a stele in the Sanctuary of the Syrian Gods on Delos, one 
Theagenes asks for justice against a woman to whom he has lent money for her 
manumission and who has not returned it; see Björck 1938: 30 n. 14; Versnel 1999: 
141; Salvo 2012: 252–253. 
viii See Stewart and Strathern 2004 for illuminating anthropological studies. For 
discussion of some ancient examples, see Gordon 1999; Bryen and Wypustek 2009. 
ix For another example, dating to 197 CE, see the series of petitions filed by 
Gemellus Horion, a landholder in Karanis, see P.Mich VI 423–424; Bryen and 
Wypustek 2009. 
x All translations of Libanius’ Orations are from Norman 1992 unless otherwise noted. 
xi Although I will cite material from their earlier formulation of this theory (in Lawson 
and McCauley 1990), this analysis employs the terminology of its later presentation 
(in McCauley and Lawson 2002).  
 
xii See also Sørensen 2005 for an analysis of the hermeneutic strategies involved in 
ritual interpretation.  
 
xiii Cf. Frederick Naerebout on ritual dance; he captures this ambiguity in his 
statement that “[p]ublic events and all ritualized behavior that goes with it are 
realized in particular performance, and they are changing from the one performance 
to the next.” (2006: 44). 
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xiv As Bell puts it, “Relationships of power are drawn from the social body and then 
reappropriated by the social body as experience” (1992: 207). 
xv A sample, with no claim to be comprehensive, includes Calame 1977; Lonsdale 
1993; Versnel 1993; Burkert 1996; Naerebout 1997; Bierl 2009. In work on the role 
of the body in the performance of religious rituals within sacred space, along with the 
interaction of ritual and architectural spaces, has recently received greater focus, 
see, e.g., Mylonopoulos 2006; Naerebout 2006. 
xvi Others have noted this dichotomy: e.g., Smith noted that the adoption of speech-
act theory may be a way of trying to overcome it, but expressed uncertainty as to 
whether “the generating distinction between constatives and performatives is not a 
reinscription of the same duality” (2002: 90); in the same volume, Versnel describes 
“twin strategies widely applied in this type of medical magic . . . These two strategies 
consist of ritual action on the hand and ritual words on the other” and asks the reader 
to bear in mind that “words and deeds are often two complementary and inseparable 
parts of one ritual process” (2002: 107). 
